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This year’s Munich Security Conference has laid bare the differences in the US and German 
visions of international order and security in speeches given by Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
US Vice President Mike Pence. Germany fundamentally disagrees with the Trump administra-
tion both on the paradigm of inter-state strategic competition with China and Russia (and 
Iran) and on the redefinition of the political, economic and military terms of the alliance with 
Europe. Berlin, aware of the growing challenges to European and global order and securi-
ty, rejects the American ‘peace through strength’ policy, but at the same time has failed to 
present any real alternative. Merkel’s defence of the multilateral approach and of the liberal 
international order (understood as shaping the policy with partners and allies, above all the 
USA, but also in dialogue with China and Russia) is not a viable alternative any more. Nor is 
developing comprehensive European strategic autonomy in the French spirit, independent 
of the United States. Berlin is still aware that the alliance with the USA form the foundations 
of German and European security and prosperity even if Washington is becoming an increas-
ingly difficult partner and ally. Given the long-term domestic limitations that shape German 
foreign and security policy, it is difficult to expect any major change in Germany’s in-between 
course in the coming years. The continued disagreements between the two biggest allies over 
key security issues will present an increasing challenge to NATO’s Eastern flank countries. 
International order and the alliance with 
Europe according to the US
The Trump administration has given up the as-
sumption that security and economic develop-
ment can be achieved through co-operation 
in international relations, and treats strategic 
competition with global revisionist powers 
(China and Russia) and with regional rivals (North 
Korea and Iran) as its primary security con-
cern1. The USA views China as its main global 
1	 M.	A.	 Piotrowski,	 B.	Wiśniewski,	The U.S. National Se-
curity Strategy: The Trump Administration’s Approach, 
‘PISM Bulletin’, 21 December 2017, https://www.pism.
pl/publications/bulletin/no-128-1068#; M. A. Piotrowski, 
Changes in the Main Assumptions of the U.S. Nation-
al Defense Strategy, ‘PISM Bulletin’, 26 January 2018, 
http://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-14-1085#
competitor and wants to contain its growing 
influence	 by	 political,	 economic	 and	 military	
means. In Europe the USA wants to counter 
Russia	in	the	first	place	but	it	also	strives	to	re-
strict	Chinese	influence.	This	analysis	of	the	stra-
tegic environment results in the return to the 
‘peace through strength’ policy, i.e. maintaining 
a military advantage over strategic adversaries. 
This concept, mentioned also in Mike Pence’s 
Munich	speech,	refers	to	Ronald	Reagan’s	pol-
icy in the 1980s2. By adopting this paradigm 
2 Mike Pence, Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 
2019 Munich Security Conference, 16 February 2019, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/re-
marks-vice-president-pence-2019-munich-security-con-
ference-munich-germany/ 
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in international relations, Washington recog-
nises	that	it	is	necessary	to	reform	the	political,	
economic	 and	military	 foundations	of	 its	glob-
al dominance and to adjust the existing inter-
national order to US needs and interests. This 
also	 involves	 a	 revision	 of	 trade	 agreements,	
treaties	 and	 a	 reform	 of	 existing	 alliances3. 
The	USA	 is	 thus	 redefining	the	 terms	of	polit-
ical, economic and military co-operation with 
Europe (amongst others). On the political lev-
el, the Trump administration is questioning the 
value	of	 the	multilateral	approach	 in	 relations	
with its European allies. It no longer wants to 
play	the	role	of	a	benign	hegemon,	and	 is	 in-
creasingly insisting they adjust to the US pol-
icy, pursuant to the America First approach4. 
With regard to economic relations, Washing-
ton	wants	to	 improve	terms	of	trade	with	the	
European Union and is even ready to resort to 
a trade war to achieve its goals. On the mili-
tary level, the USA expects the European allies 
to increase their military potential and thus to 
adjust	 to	 the	 changing	balance	of	power	 and	
to support the US-led deterrence policy in Eu-
rope	 (and	 partly	 in	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region). 
It also counts on their increased engagement 
in combating terrorism in the European neigh-
bourhood. Another issue is Washington’s insist-
ence on increasing European pressure on Iran, 
and	on	EU	member	states	to	withdraw	from	the	
nuclear deal with Tehran.
3 Mike Pompeo, a speech during the GMF in Brussels: Re-
storing the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal In-
ternational Order, 4 December 2018, https://www.state.
gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287770.htm 
4	 ”Multilateralism	has	too	often	become	viewed	as	an	end	
unto	itself”	–	Mike	Pompeo	in	his	speech	in	Brussels;	see	
footnote	3.
From	the	US	point	of	view,	Europe	is	the	play-
ground	 for	 strategic	 competition	 above	 all	
with Russia. Thus the Trump administration has 
strengthened the investments commenced by 
President	Obama	in	improving	the	defence	and	
deterrence in Europe. The US military presence 
in Europe is expanding thanks to the increased 
budget	 for	 the	European Deterrence Initiative 
(from	US$3.4	billion	 in	2017	 to	US$6.5	billion	
in	2019).	It	includes	an	intensified	US	rotational	
military presence, participation in exercises and 
investments	 in	military	 infrastructure	 (air	 and	
naval	bases	and	training	grounds)	–	all	this	not	
only	 on	 the	 Eastern	 flank	 but	 also	 in	Norway	
and Germany (amongst other countries). At the 
same time, the USA is pressing NATO allies to 
increase:	 defence	 spending,	 the	 readiness	 of	
European	armed	forces,	and	the	military	pres-
ence	 of	 Western	 European	 countries	 on	 the	
Eastern	 flank.	 If	 not	 for	 Washington’s	 pres-
sure, the decision to deploy NATO battlegroups 
in the Baltic states and Poland would have been 
hardly possible. The NATO Readiness Initiative, 
as	part	of	which	member	states	have	commit-
ted	to	increase	the	readiness	of	at	least	part	of	
their	forces,	was	also	adopted	by	NATO	as	a	re-
sult	of	US	pressure5. 
Strategic competition in Europe is also taking 
place in the economy. From Washington’s point 
of	view	it	is	essential	to	oust	both	Russian	and	
Chinese	influence	from	areas	of	key	significance	
for	 security,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 strength-
ening the US economic position in Europe. This 
stance	has	been	manifested	in	strong	US	pres-
sure on Germany (on halting the construction 
of	the	Nord	Stream	2	gas	pipeline)	and	on	the	
Five Eyes intelligence-sharing countries, France 
and Germany and Central Eastern Europe (on 
excluding Chinese participation in investments 
5	 As	part	of	the	NATO	Readiness	Initiative	adopted	during	
the NATO Summit in Brussels in July 2018, the allies un-
dertook	to	increase	the	readiness	of	their	armed	forces.	
They	are	expected	to	be	capable	of	deploying	30	mech-
anised battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 naval combat 
vessels within 30 days. These troops would be tasked 
with	–	in	case	of	conflict	in	the	region	–	strengthening	
the NATO Response Force (NRF).
The USA expects the European allies to 
increase their military potential and thus 
to adjust to the changing global balance 
of power.
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in the 5G networks). US Vice President Mike 
Pence	 in	Munich	 repeated	 the	message	 from	
the Trump administration that Washington can-
not	ensure	the	defence	of	the	West	if	US	allies	
grow dependent on the East (China and Russia). 
Germany and the new US paradigm
Germany	 fundamentally	 disagrees	 with	 the	
Trump administration both on the paradigm 
of	strategic	competition	with	China	and	Russia	
and	 on	 the	 redefinition	 of	 the	 political,	 eco-
nomic	and	military	terms	of	the	US	alliance	with	
Europe. In her speech in Munich6 Chancellor 
Merkel	demonstrated	this	stance	and	defended	
the	German	vision	of	international	relations	and	
Berlin’s security policy. Her speech needs to be 
read	also	in	the	context	of	growing	US	pressure	
(also	linked	with	the	departure	of	pro-Transat-
lantic	 officials	 from	 the	 Trump	 administration	
such as Gen. James Mattis). 
First	 of	 all,	 Germany	 does	 not	want	 to	 brand	
Russia and China as strategic rivals because it 
is not ready to embrace the political, econom-
ic	and	military	consequences	of	this	approach. 
It sees the need to counteract those Chinese and 
Russian	policies	and	activities	that	are	harmful	
to German and European interests but in gen-
eral it believes that it is necessary to develop 
‘multilateral’ compromise solutions that will 
create	 the	 basis	 for	 peaceful	 coexistence	 and	
economic	development.	 In	 the	case	of	Russia,	
Germany is ready to continue supporting the 
EU	sanctions	against	Moscow	for	violating	 in-
ternational	law	(the	annexation	of	Crimea)	and	
even to impose stricter sanctions in case the sit-
uation in Ukraine escalates. It is also ready to 
increase, to a certain extent, military spending 
and	engagement	in	NATO’s	defence	and	deter-
rence policy, including the Bundeswehr’s pres-
6 Angela Merkel, Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zur 55. 
Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz am 16. Februar 2019 in 
München, 16 February 2019, https://www.bundeskanz-
lerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-
merkel-zur-55-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-am-
16-februar-2019-in-muenchen-1580936 
ence in Lithuania and participation in the NATO 
Response Force. At the same time, Germany 
continues to emphasise that the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act is still binding; this is aimed at re-
stricting NATO’s (and the US’s) military presence 
on	 the	 Eastern	 flank	 to	 avoid	 ‘antagonising’	
Russia. Berlin does not want the USA and NATO 
to	 make	 a	 firm,	 symmetrical	 response	 to	 the	
development	 and	 deployment	 of	 the	 Russian	
land-based missile systems violating the INF 
Treaty;	it	has	emphasised	the	need	for	dialogue	
on arms control (although it seems also to be 
ready	 to	 reinforce	 NATO’s	 deterrence	 posture	
to a limited extent). Germany also sees no rea-
son	 for	 restricting	 its	 economic	 relations	with	
Russia (where the EU sanctions do not apply). 
Chancellor	Merkel	in	Munich	defended	Germa-
ny’s engagement in the Nord Stream 2 project 
with the bizarre argument that NS2 can be 
used as an instrument to prevent Russia’s grow-
ing dependence on China. She emphasised at 
the	same	time	the	need	to	diversify	the	sourc-
es	of	gas	supply	to	Germany	and	Europe	–	also	
through	LNG	imports	from	the	USA.	In	the	case	
of	China,	Germany	also	disagrees	with	the	US	
paradigm	of	strategic	competition	with	Beijing.	
Even though it sees China’s economic policy in-
creasingly as a challenge and protects its own 
interests in a more assertive manner, it believes 
that the West’s response to China’s growing 
power	 should	 be	 found	 in	 dialogue	 and	 not	
in	confrontation	with	China.	The	German	gov-
ernment is currently discussing its 5G strategy, 
which	will	serve	as	a	litmus	test	for	German	pol-
icy towards China (and the USA). 
Berlin	views	the	Trump	administration’s	 redef-
inition	 of	 the	 political,	 economic	 and	military	
Germany is not ready to embrace the 
political, economic and military conse-
quences of the American ‘peace through 
strength’ approach.
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terms	of	the	alliance	with	Europe	as	an	equally	
fundamental	problem	for	US-German	relations.	
Politically, the unilateralism practiced by the 
Trump	administration	–	acting	without	consult-
ing	its	allies	–	or	even	disregarding	them	–	and	
expecting	them	to	adjust	to	the	US	policies	–	is	
unacceptable	 for	 a	 Germany	which	 had	 been	
the	key	European	partner	of	the	United	States	
in international policy during the Obama ad-
ministration. Economically and militarily, Ger-
many is Trump’s target due to its largest econo-
my in the EU that maintains a trade surplus with 
the	USA,	and	for	its	weakest	military	amongst	
the	largest	European	allies.	This	approach	from	
the Trump administration is a major threat to 
the	position	of	Germany	 in	 international	 rela-
tions that is based on trade, diplomacy and di-
alogue. For all these reasons, dislike and even 
hostility towards the Trump administration is 
growing among the German political elite, as 
manifested	 in	 the	 very	 cool	 reception	 of	 US	
officials	 in	Munich.	 Thus	 Berlin	 is	 investing	 in	
co-operation with the Democratic Party which 
seem	to	favour	the	German	approach	to	inter-
national relations to a greater degree. 
While rejecting the political goals and means 
employed by the Trump administration, Ger-
many	 is	 still	aware	of	 the	 fact	 that	NATO	and	
co-operation	with	the	USA	form	the	foundation	
of	German	and	European	security.	For	this	rea-
son	Berlin	is	not	ready	to	support	a	full-fledged	
strategic alternative to the alliance with the 
USA, i.e. developing a comprehensive EU stra-
tegic	 autonomy	 independently	 of	 the	 USA,	
which France is interested in. However, it does 
support	the	development	of	an	EU	security	and	
defence	 policy,	 as	was	 emphasised	 by	Merkel	
in	Munich.	A	full	strategic	autonomy	of	the	EU	
would entail political, industrial and military 
consequences.	 This	 would	 also	 intensify	 the	
pressure on Germany to enhance its military ca-
pabilities	and	would	raise	the	issue	of	European	
nuclear deterrence. This, as with the adoption 
of	a	more	assertive	security	and	defence	policy	
with regard to Russia and China, is still very un-
likely	in	the	case	of	Berlin.	
Germany’s response: 
a strategy or no strategy? 
Germany’s response to the Trump administra-
tion’s paradigm, repeated by Chancellor Merkel 
in	Munich,	 is	 an	appeal	 to	defend	 the	 ‘liberal	
international order’ based on multilateralism 
understood as shaping the policy jointly with 
partners and allies, above all the USA, but also 
in dialogue with China and Russia. Paradoxical-
ly, in the changing strategic environment such 
a	 non-confrontational	 approach	 does	 not	 im-
ply	the	defence	of	the	liberal	status quo but it 
rather	enables	a	regulated	transition	from	the	
dominance	 of	 the	 West	 under	 US	 leadership	
to a multi-polar world with growing Chinese 
and	 Russian	 influence.	 Both	 China	 and	 Russia	
see	the	readiness	for	dialogue	and	the	 lack	of 
a	tough	stance	as	a	weakness	of	the	West	which	
should be exploited to challenge the global and 
European order underwritten by US political, 
economic and military power. This German ap-
proach	 –	which	 is	 viewed	 by	 some	 experts	 as 
a	desire	 to	 ‘return	 to	 the	past’	or	 as	 a	 lack	of	
strategic	 thinking	 and	 a	 refusal	 to	 see	 a	 new	
strategic	 reality	 –	 is	 conditioned	 by	 domestic	
limitations	that	shape	German	foreign	and	secu-
rity policy. Since these are long-term, any major 
change in German policy is unlikely to happen 
even	after	Chancellor	Merkel	leaves	office.	
The	German	 security	 and	defence	policy	was,	
is and to an increasing extent will be the sub-
ject	 of	 controversy	 and	 an	 inter-party	 dead-
lock that will continue to restrict Berlin’s room 
for	manoeuvre	 in	NATO	and	 in	the	EU.	Signif-
icant developments in the German security 
Berlin is nevertheless aware of the fact 
that NATO and co-operation with the USA 
form the foundation of European security. 
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and	 defence	 policy	 have	 depended	 to	 a	 high	
degree on a cross-party consensus, which will 
be hard to reach with the governing coalition 
parties taking increasingly divergent positions. 
The Social Democratic Party (SPD), whose sup-
port	 level	has	 fallen	below	20%,	 is	 redefining	
its political agenda. There are many indications 
that	it	will	be	focused	on	social	issues	with	in-
tensified	pacifist	rhetoric.	The	inter-party	stale-
mate is best illustrated by the recent discussions 
on	defence	spending	and	on	the	suspension	of	
the INF Treaty. While generally recognising the 
need	to	allocate	2%	of	GDP	to	military	spending	
the Christian Democrats support a more realis-
tic	 increase	of	 the	German	defence	budget	 to	
1.5%	of	GDP	by	2024.	German	government	pre-
sented these plans to NATO in January this year. 
They were then questioned in public by the So-
cial	Democratic	Minister	of	Finance,	who	stated	
that, considering the expected slow econom-
ic growth in the coming years, these promis-
es would most likely not be kept. The Green 
Party	 and	 the	 Left	 Party	 are	 also	 opposed	 to	
increasing	 defence	 spending.	 The	 stances	 on	
the	 suspension	 of	 the	 INF	 Treaty	 are	 similarly	
split. The Christian Democrats, and in particular 
the CSU, want Germany and NATO to act more 
decisively. However, the CDU does not want 
a	symmetric	response	from	NATO	(i.e.	a	deploy-
ment	of	land-based	intermediate-range	missile	
systems);	the	SPD	focuses	on	commencing	talks	
on disarmament and arms control between the 
USA, Russia and China almost entirely exclud-
ing	other	options.	 Regardless	of	 this,	 the	 FDP	
has	accused	the	Social	Democratic	Minister	of	
Foreign	Affairs	of	making	insufficient	efforts	to	
encourage the partners to start this dialogue. 
Additionally, there is the Green Party, whose 
representatives insist that Germany should join 
the	Treaty	on	the	Prohibition	of	Nuclear	Weap-
ons and that US nuclear weapons should be 
withdrawn	from	Germany.	
The diverging stances adopted by the key polit-
ical parties, the anti-Trump sentiments among 
the	 German	 elites,	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	
Trump administration in the German media as 
the	greatest	threat	to	Germany,	and	the	lack	of	
clear	message	from	the	government	on	the	im-
portance	of	the	relations	with	the	USA	–	all	this	
results	in	the	aggravation	of	the	anti-American	
sentiments among the German public. Germans 
are	hardly	aware	of	the	significance	of	the	alli-
ance	with	 the	USA	for	 their	country’s	 security	
and economic development. This is illustrated 
by	the	results	of	public	opinion	polls	that	were	
published in the Munich Security Report 2019. 
Germans think that United States’ power and 
influence	is	a	major	threat	to	their	country	(49%	
of	respondents),	and	to	a	lesser	extent	China’s	
(33%)	and	Russia’s	 (30%).	Likewise,	more	Ger-
mans	have	confidence	 in	Vladimir	Putin	 (35%)	
and	 Xi	 Jinping	 (30%)	 than	 in	 Donald	 Trump	
(10%)7. This has also been proven by a poll con-
ducted	in	February	this	year	for	the	ARD	televi-
sion	broadcaster:	only	24%	of	respondents	rec-
ognise the USA as a trustworthy partner, while 
28%	of	Germans	recognise	China	as	such,	and	
35%	are	ready	to	trust	Russia8. 
Germany’s	political	options	 in	 foreign	and	se-
curity policy are also limited by problems in 
reforming	 and	 modernising	 the	 Bundeswehr.	
A	report	from	the	Parliamentary	Armed	Forces	
Commissioner presented in January this year9 
7 Munich Security Report 2019, The Great Puzzle: Who 
will Pick Up the Pieces?, February 2019, https://www.
securityconference.de/en/publications/munich-securi-
ty-report/munich-security-report-2019/ 
8 ARD-DeutschlandTrend, Mehrheit sieht Grundrente po-
sitiv, 14 February 2019, https://www.tagesschau.de/in-
land/deutschlandtrend/index.html 
9 Bundestag, Wehrbeauftragter beklagt „Überorganisati-
on“ in der Bundeswehr, 29 January 2019, https://www.
bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2019/kw05-wehr-
bericht/589712
The German attitude towards the new US 
paradigm is partly conditioned by domestic 
limitations that shape German foreign and 
security policy.
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once again showed the extremely slow tempo 
of	 improving	the	situation	 in	the	German	mil-
itary.	 Insufficient	 funding	 is	 not	 the	 only	 rea-
son. In the report, the Bundeswehr was called 
a ‘bureaucratic monster’ being consumed by 
excessive	 regulation	 and	 funds	 mismanage-
ment leading to much higher spending on 
modernisation programmes than necessary. 
The	 availability	 of	 arms	 and	 military	 equip-
ment	has	 improved	only	 to	a	 small	 extent	 af-
ter	 years	 of	 austerity	 and	 so-called	 ‘dynamic	
management’	which	in	fact	meant	incomplete	
equipment and limiting spare parts supply. 
The	German	land	forces	will	have	(only)	one	fully	
modernised and equipped mechanised brigade 
operationally ready as late as in 2023. This is 
a	good	illustration	of	the	state	of	affairs	but	at	
the same time it does not mean that the Bundes- 
wehr	 is	 totally	 defunct.	 Regardless	 of	 all	 the	
problems, it is able to maintain around 3,000 
soldiers	on	out-of-area	crisis	management	mis-
sions and operations (around 1,000 in Mali and 
Afghanistan	each)	and	around	500	soldiers	 in	
Lithuania	as	part	of	NATO	deterrence	efforts	on	
the	Eastern	flank.	In	autumn	2018,	8,000	Bun-
deswehr soldiers took part in NATO’s collec-
tive	defence	exercise	(Trident	Juncture	2018)	in	
Norway. However, the German Armed Forces’ 
capabilities	of	conducting	conventional	opera-
tions are and will remain limited. Coupled with 
the	approach	of	German	political	elite	and	pub-
lic sentiments, all this means that Russia will 
never see Germany as a country able to develop 
a	reliable	defence	and	deterrence	policy	without	
US political and military engagement in Europe. 
Changing paradigms and NATO’s 
Eastern flank 
The	 Trump	 administration’s	 paradigm	 of	 stra-
tegic	competition,	coupled	with	the	redefining	
of	 alliances,	 is	 opening	 up	 new	opportunities	
to	the	Eastern	flank	countries	(Poland,	the	Bal-
tic states and Romania), but it also generates 
challenges.	On	one	hand,	the	US	perception	of	
Russia	as	a	geopolitical	 rival	of	 the	West	 is	 in	
line with the analysis presented by these coun-
tries	already	before	2014.	Thus	the	US	pressure	
on	Europe	to	curb	Russian	influence	(e.g.	with	
regard	 to	 NS2)	 supports	 the	 position	 of	 Po-
land, the Baltic states and Romania in the EU. 
On the other hand, the Trump administra-
tion’s scepticism about the multilateral ap-
proach	 offers	 new	 opportunities	 to	 enhance	
bilateral co-operation and to increase the US 
military	 presence	 on	 the	 Eastern	 flank.	 From 
a regional perspective more US engagement 
strengthens	defence	and	deterrence	in	the	re-
gion and does not undermine NATO, contrary 
to the opinion shared across Western Europe. 
Countries like Poland are thus ready to invest 
in bilateral relations with the USA in order to 
reinforce	regional	security.	However,	this	bilat-
eral approach also entails challenges, such as 
a growing dependence and susceptibility to 
pressure	from	an	increasingly	difficult	ally,	which	
Washington is becoming. Questions also arise 
regarding whether such a bilateral relationship 
will continue with the next US administration 
after	Trump.	
However, neither the German multilateral ap-
proach nor the European strategic autonomy 
concept	promoted	by	France	offer	a	real	alter-
native to guaranteeing European and regional 
security. Without the US, Germany (and Eu-
rope)	are	unable	to	develop	a	reliable	defence	
and deterrence policy vis-à-vis Russia. Further-
more,	 Germany	 is	 ready	 –	while	 totally	 disre-
garding	the	stance	and	interests	of	the	Eastern	
flank	countries	–	to	 implement	economic	pro-
jects (NS2) that enhance Moscow’s political 
and	 business	 influence	 in	 Germany	 and	 that	
undermine the region’s energy security. In turn, 
France preaches the need to develop Europe-
an	strategic	autonomy	in	security	and	defence	
The increasingly strained relations be-
tween Washington and Berlin are not ben-
eficial to NATO’s Eastern flank countries.
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but	focuses	entirely	on	strengthening	the	EU’s	
capabilities	 for	 crisis	 management	 and	 by	 no	
means	 views	 collective	 defence	 as	 being	 part	
of	it.	Neither	Germany	nor	France	is	willing	to	
accept	any	other	perspectives	in	European	for-
eign and security policy beside their own, and 
the arrangements made by the German-French 
tandem	 –	 regardless	 of	 all	 the	 differences	
between	 the	 two	 countries	 in	 this	 area	 –	 are	
meant	to	be	binding	for	the	entire	EU.	This	ap-
proach	 limits	the	room	for	manoeuvre	for	the	
Eastern	flank	countries	as	 regards	 real	partici-
pation in debates on European security and in 
the decision-making process in the EU. It is also 
far	 from	 the	multilateral	 paradigm	 that	Berlin	
preaches in relations with the USA. 
The increasingly strained relations between 
Washington	 and	 Berlin	 are	 not	 beneficial	 to	
NATO’s	 Eastern	 flank	 countries	 –	 in	 a	 situa-
tion when they are militarily dependent on 
co-operation with the USA but politically and 
economically belong to the European Union, 
where Berlin holds the dominant position. 
These countries, including Poland, do not want 
a	further	escalation	of	the	divides	inside	NATO.	
Therefore	 they	 are	 currently	 emphasising	 the	
need to develop a joint response by the allies 
to	 the	end	of	 the	 INF	Treaty	and	are	 interest-
ed in Berlin’s increased military spending and 
readiness to enhance NATO’s deterrence pos-
ture in order to reduce Transatlantic tensions. 
At the same time they see the need to develop 
an	EU	security	and	defence	policy	 that	would	
strengthen the European military potential but 
not in opposition to the USA, and also in line 
with their own security concerns. 
